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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE V. ALEXANDER and 
AL JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs - Appellants , 
v. 
ED DE LA CRUZ and 
BETH DE LA CRUZ, 
Defendants - Respondents 
Case No. 13928 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE. 
Appellant sued to r ecove r judgment for money and of forec losure 
on a p r o m i s s o r y note to r e a l proper ty mor tgage . 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT. 
The case was t r ied on October 13, 1974, before the Honorable 
Calvin Gould, judge of the Dis t r ic t Court of Weber County, Utah, without 
a jury . The t r i a l cour t d i smissed the cause as to Beth DeLa Cruz as it 
was es tabl ished that the r e a l p roper ty was he r s and that the other 
defendant (her husband) had forged her name to the note and mor tgage . 
The court d i smissed as to the Defendant Ed DeLaCruz for the r ea son 
that the evidence failed to show a legal considerat ion by which he could 
be bound to the note. 
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Respondent DeLaCruz also disposed of c a r s by improper ly taking them 
out of t rus t at the bank and without paying the Bank. By doing this he 
was wrongfully out of t rus t at the Bank in the amount of $7, 657. 00. 
Appellants guarantee to the bank did not cover this and Appellants 
had no obligation to the Bank or to DeLaCruz to pay this amount back to 
the bank. When it was discovered that Respondent was $7, 600. 00 out 
of t rus t at the bank, then he d iscussed with Appellants the fact that 
if the bank were not r e i m b u r s e d for the amount out of t rus t , that 
Respondent would lose his l icense and be subject to other possible 
penal t ies which would mean that he would lose his future livelihood. 
He agreed , according to his tes t imony, that he did owe this amount to 
the bank and that the bank would not accept his note. Respondent 
agreed with Appellants that if Appellants would cover him by signing 
a note at said bank for the amount of Respondent was out of t rus t , that 
he and his wife would sign a note to Appellants and give a mor tgage on 
a home which Respondent s tated that he and his wife Beth DeLaCruz 
owned. The note and mor tgage sued on here were then del ivered to 
Appellants by that Respondent. Both note and mor tgage were signed 
and the mor tgage was notar ized with both Respondent and his wife's 
name on them. Respondent then made cer ta in payments on the note 
and Appellants r eco rded the mor tgage . Without the s ignature of 
Respondent and his wife on the note and mortgage Appellants would 
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not have signed the note for Respondent at the bank. Because Respondent 
failed to pay his note, Appellants had to pay off their note at Bank of 
Utah. Respondent at no time advised Appellants up until time of law 
suit, that his wife's signature on the note and mortgage were forgeries 
and that he, in fact, had no interest in the land which he had mortgaged 
to them. At trial Respondent and his wife testified that her signature on 
the note and mortgage were forgeries. Respondent testified that he had 
forged his wife's signature and had misrepresented to the Appellants 
that it was her signature. He testified that he had without authority 
taken a notary seal of Rick Beyer and had attached this to the mortgage 
and had forged Rick Beyers signature intending to further mislead 
Appellants. The tr ial court relied on Manwell vs. Oyler, 11 Utah 2nd 433, 
461 P 2d 177, to hold that a promissory note to be binding must have the 
consideration established as a burden of proof by the payee or holder 
and that there was no consideration in Appellants signing a note for 
Respondent at the bank, 
POINTS ON APPEAL. 
POINT I 
The Lower Court e r r e d in holding that it is the Payee-Holders 
burden to show that a promissory note was given for consideration before 
he can prevail. 
A promissory note under the Uniform Commercial Code is presumed 
to have been given for consideration. It is not appellants burden to show 
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the consideration, the respondent must rebut it. 11 Am Jur 2nd, Sec. 216 
states: "Like any other contract, a negotiable instrument requires a 
consideration as between the original parties, or a recognized substitute 
therefor, but such an instrument is presumed to have been issued for a 
valuable consideration. " 
In 11 Am Jur 2nd, Sec 188, page 222 the law is that: "There is 
a presumption of consideration for a negotiable instrument even though 
there is no recital of consideration, and the presumption may be rebutted 
even though consideration is recited. " 
The Respondent acknowledged to the court that when the note was 
signed, he felt that he was receiving consideration from the appellants. 
Respondent at trial gave no testimony to rebut the presumption of con-
sideration. The Utah Uniform Commercial Code, Title 70A-3-307-(2) 
Utah Code Annotated, states "(2) When signatures are admitted or 
established, production of the instrument entitles a holder to recover on 
it unless the defendant establishes a defense. " In this case the defendant 
Ed DeLaCruz's signature on the note and mortgage were admitted by him. 
11 Am Jur 2nd, Sec. 215, page 244, further states "like any other 
contract a negotiable instrument-requires a consideration as between the 
original parties or a recognized substitute therefor, but such an instru-
ment is presumed to have been issued for a valuable consideration. " 
In this case the appellants had guaranteed to the bank that each car 
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floored or placed in t rus t would be sold for as much as the flooring 
on that c a r . They did not guarantee that Respondent would not embezzle 
the c a r s from out of t rus t . His dea le rs l icense and bond were the bank's 
insurance on th i s . When Respondent removed $7, 000 to $8, 000 worth of 
c a r s out of t rus t and sold them i l legal ly and then overdrew this same 
amount from the Company he was in effect s teal ing from the bank. 
Appellants and Respondent knew that the only way to keep Respondent 
from losing his bond and his l icense and perhaps m o r e was for Appellants 
to help him by cover ing his " s h o r t s " at the bank of Utah with the i r own 
p r o m i s s o r y note. This was ample considerat ion for Respondent giving 
Appellants his own note and mortgage in the s a m e amount to cover any 
loss Appellants might suffer. Appellants did in fact have to pay off their 
note at the bank except for the $1 , 275. 00 payment which Respondent made 
to them. The Lower Court should have granted Appellants a judgment 
where Respondent did not meet his burden to show lack of considerat ion. 
POINT II 
The Lower C o u r t e r r e d in not recognizing what consti tutes 
legal considerat ion. 
ARGUMENT 
P a r t A. The Lower Court re l ied on the case of Manwill v. Oyler , 
11 Utah 2nd 433, 461 P2 177 in making its decision. Appellants do 
not feel this case is in point under the fact si tuation in the p resen t c a s e . 
P a r t B. What appears to be the general law on considerat ion is s ta ted 
in 11 Am Jur 2nd in Section 216 at page 244: "The genera l pr inciples 
- 6 -
as to what constitutes consideration for a contract, full discussion of 
which appears in another article, apply in determining what constitutes 
consideration for a bill or note. Any consideration that is , any valuable 
consideration as distinguished from 'good' consideration, sufficient 
to support a simple contract, supports a negotiable instrument. 
Thus, while nothing is a consideration unless it is known and agreed 
to as such by both part ies, and these definitions are not completely 
comprehensive, consideration may be said to consist in any benefit to 
the promisor, or in a loss or detriment to the promisee, or to exist 
when at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person 
has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing, or 
promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, the consideration 
being the act, abstinence, or promise. It has been said generally that 
to give a consideration value for the supporting of a promise, it must 
be such as deprives the person to whom the promise is made of a right 
which he possessed before, or else confers upon the other party a 
benefit which he could not otherwise have had. 
Consideration may be given to the promisor or to some other 
person. It matters not from whom the consideration moves or to whom 
it goes. If it is bargained for as the exchange for the promise, the 
promise,is not gratuitous. Consideration need not move from the 
promisee, and it need not be pecuniary or beneficial to the promisor. .• 
Consideration moving to the promisor may be a benefit to a third person 
or a detriment incurred on his behalf. " 
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And 11 Am Jur 2nd Sec 236 states: "Consideration for a bill or note may 
consist of money or property received by the maker, a contract of sale, 
an assignment of a claim, a sale of such title, if any, as the seller has 
(a quit claim deed), or the grant of a privilege, an inconvenience, or 
some risk or trouble incurred by the promisee at the instance of the 
promisor. 
Consideration may also consist of money or property received, 
lent, advanced, or returned by the payee to a third person or an 
extension of credit to a third person, at the instance of the maker and 
with his knowledge and consent. . . . " 
And Section 218 states: "The consideration which renders a promise binding 
need not exist at the time an instrument is executed. If what is anticipated 
or requested by the promisor is performed by the promisee, it is not 
necessary that the promisee have promised or been under an obligation 
to perform the act. Thus, a bill or note given for services to be 
performed in the future is binding, for the full amount when services are 
subsequently rendered, even where there was no agreement to render 
the services. " 
In this case the Respondent DeLaCruz caused his corporation to 
become "out of trust" to the Bank of Utah in the sum of approximately 
$8, 500. 00. He admitted that without Appellants giving their personal 
note to said bank and paying this note personally to cover this "out of 
trust" that he could have lost his dealer fs license and bond. Respondent 
persuaded Appellants to help him and gave his own note and forged mortgage 
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to induce them to do so . This was an act which was not r equ i red of 
Appellants under thei r guarantee at the Bank. It was c lear ly at some 
" r i sk and t rouble" to Appellants . It was a lso a r e t u r n of money by 
Appellants to the Bank with Respondents knowledge and consent . 
CONCLUSION: 
The respondents des i re to draw $7, 000 to $ 8, 000 m o r e out of 
the Company he managed than it legi t imately earned caused him to 
dispose of this same amount of c a r s out of t ru s t . His des i re not to 
be caught by the bank or his bonding company or the ca r dealer l icensing 
depar tment of the State of Utah caused him to persuade Appellants to 
cover his out of t rus t amount at the Bank with Appellants personal note. 
He was so anxious to have them do this that he was willing to r ep re sen t 
that he and his wife owned a home which they would mortgage and 
secu re Appellants . It was so important to him that he forged his wife's 
name to the note and mor tgage . He was so eager to have Appellants 
bail him out of trouble that he was willing to misappropr ia te Rick B e y e r ' s 
notary sea l and place it on the mortgage and forge B e y e r ' s name to it. 
He felt that Appellants had given him sufficient help and considerat ion 
that he repaid them some $ 1 , 300 on his note. Now after Appellants have -
paid off their note at the Bank and Respondent is no longer in trouble at 
the bank or his bonding company or the State of Utah, he refuses to pay. 
Therefore , Appellants ask that a new t r i a l be awarded or in the 
a l te rna t ive , that Appellants be granted judgment for the amount due on 
the note. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
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